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FEE-FOR-SERVICE CLINICAL TEACHING:
SLIPPING TOWARD COMMERCIALISM
LISA

I.

G.

LERMAN*

INTRODUcrION

The Report of the Task Force on Law Schools and the Profession
(the MacCrate Report) observes that law schools are deficient in
training students in the skills and values needed to practice law. The
report urges curriculum revision to attend to these important objectives.1 Many law teachers-especially clinicians-agree at least in
principle with the main message of the MacCrate report; the question
is what to do and how to pay for it.
Clinical teaching tends to be more expensive than large lecture
classes, if only because of the lower teacher-student ratio.2 This poses
a barrier to massive expansion of in-house clinics, and renders it unlikely that live-client clinical programs will serve every law student.3
The Chicago-Kent College of Law at the Illinois Institute of Technology has addressed the need to expand skills training with limited
financial resources by constructing employment contracts with most of
its clinical teachers in which the clinicians "pay for themselves" by
representing clients who pay fees for legal services. The clients are
charged as they would be for the services of a lawyer in a private law
firm. If a teacher brings in more in client fees than is necessary to
cover his or her salary and overhead, most of the excess is paid to the
teacher as a bonus.
* Visiting Associate Professor, American University, Washington College of Law, Associate Professor, The Catholic University of America, The Columbus School of Law. I
appreciate the ideas and advice I received about this essay from Ron Collins, Bob Dinerstein and Philip Schrag.
I AMERICAN BAR AssocIATION, SECTION OF LEGAL EDUCATION AND ADNSSIONS TO
THE BAR, TASK FORCE ON LAW SCHOOLS AND THE PROFESSION: NARROWING THE GAP,
LEGAL EDUCATION AND PROFESSIONAL DEVELOPMENT AN EDUCATIONAL CONTIN-

128, 328 (1992) (hereafter cited as MacCrate Report).
2 See generally Peter deL Swords & Frank K. Walwer, Cost Aspects of Clinical Educa-

UUM

tion, in AssOcIATION OF AMERiCAN LAW SCHOOLS-AMERICAN BAR AssOcIATION COMMr[rEE ON GUIDELINES FOR CLINICAL LEGAL EDUCATION, CLINICAL LEGAL EDUCATION

133 (1980).
3 See eg., MacCrate Report, supra note 1, at 254 n.36 (citing data on costs of in-house

clinics and observing that "[a] goal of offering enrollment in a live client in-house clinic to
every student before he or she graduates may not be feasible from a budgetary perspective
for some time"). Dean Matasar indicated his goal that the clinical program at ChicagoKent would serve half the students. AALS Tape, Matasar comments, infra note 6.
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Before other schools start down this road in response to the MacCrate report or the possible demise of Title IX, 4 it is worthwhile to
take a close look at some of the pedagogical implications of this
method of financing clinical legal education. Professor Gary Laser
and Dean Richard Matasar have initiated this exploration through

their articles in the last issue of the ClinicalLaw Review,5 and through
their comments at a recent law teachers' convention. 6 Before I present my questions about this pedagogical structure, I would applaud
Dean Matasar and Professor Laser for their willingness to experiment
in the design of their clinical program and for their decision to open
this experiment for review by the community of clinical law teachers.
U.

THE CHICAGO-KENT FEE-FOR-SERVICE CLINICAL PROGRAM7

In many respects the clinical program at Chicago-Kent looks like
other large clinical programs; there are about a dozen full-time teachers, some engaged in civil litigation, some in criminal defense work,

one in health law, one in immigration, and some others. 8 The studentteacher ratio varies from 8:1 to 11:1;9 the teachers have long-term
contracts with the law school, and participate in every aspect of gov-

ernance except tenure and promotion decisions. 10
What is most unusual about the clinic are the financial arrangements between the teachers and the law school, and between the law
4 Title IX of the Higher Education Act currently provides approximately $14 million
per year to law school clinical programs. The Republican Congress elected in late 1994 is
considering proposals to eliminate the Law School Clinical Experience Program, through
which this funding is allocated. If the program is eliminated, many clinical programs will
need to find alternative sources of funding.
5 Gary Laser, Signficant CurricularDevelopments: The MacCrate Report and Beyond,
1 CLrn. L. Rnv. 425 (1994); Richard A. Matasar, The MacCrate Report From the Dean's
Perspective, 1 CLiN. L. REv. 457 (1994).
6 "Funding of Clinical Programs: The Relationship of Mission to Money," Joint Program of the Section on Clinical Legal Education and the Section on Professional Responsibility, Annual Meeting of the Association of American Law Schools, Jan 7, 1995, New
Orleans, Louisiana. The session, which was planned and moderated by Professor Laser,
was tape recorded. References to comments made during this meeting are cited in this
essay as "AALS Tape" (available through Recorded Resources, Inc.-1995 AALS Annual
Meeting, 9501, Tape 43; on file with author).
7 Before writing this essay I sent a list of questions to Professor Gary Laser so that my
analysis of this clinical model could be informed by fuller information. I sent drafts of this
essay to Professor Laser and Dean Matasar, and included in the drafts some additional
requests for information about billing practices, pedagogy, and other topics. In response to
these requests, Professor Laser reported that he is writing another article in which he will
present more detailed information about the Chicago-Kent clinical program.
8 AALS Tape, supra note 6, Matasar comments.
9 id.
10 Id; Gary S. Laser, Legal Education I: Educatingfor ProfessionalCompetence in the
71venty-First Century: EducationalReform at Chicago-Kent College of Law, 68 Cm.KErr.
L. REv. 243, 285 n.162 (1992).
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school and the clients of the clinical programs. Most of the clinicians
at Chicago-Kent have employment contracts that require the teachers
each year to generate enough fees from clients served by the clinic to
cover their salaries. The more senior clinicians must bring in the same
amount in fees as they are paid in salary. If the fees earned by one of
the clinicians exceeds the teacher's salary, the teacher keeps ninety
percent of the excess unless it exceeds "a high rate"; at which point
the teacher is obliged to pay a higher percentage of the surplus fees to
the law school."
The clinicians hired more recently are required to bring in fees
equal to 150 percent of their salaries, to cover overhead expenses.
This group keeps 100 percent of the amount they bring in above salary
and overhead, unless the fees paid exceed some high level, at which
point they also pay the law school a higher percentage of the surplus
fees.

12

This arrangement has proved financially desirable for at least
some of the clinical teachers; Dean Matasar reports that the highest
faculty salaries at the law school are earned by clinical teachers.' 3 If a
teacher fails to generate the agreed amount of fees in a given year,
that teacher, according to Professor Laser, "must pay back a penalty
to the law school."' 14 Professor Laser reported that as of 1992, no
clinical professor has had to pay a penalty under this provision of his
15
or her employment contract.
The fee arrangements between the clinic and its clients cover
most of the range of billing options that one would find in a private
law firm; they include hourly fees, flat fees, "retainer" cases, contingent fee cases, fee-shifting cases, and pro bono cases.16 Each lawyer
sets his or her own billing rate, some charging as much as $200 per
hour. A committee of clinicians sets policy on what to bill for and at
what price. 17
Professor Laser reported that the clinic does not bill for student
time except in fee-shifting cases, in which student time is recorded and
reported as part of a fee petition.18 Students do not receive any tui11 AALS Tape, supra note 6, Matasar comments.
12 Id.

13 Id.

14 Laser, supra note 10, at 285.
15 Id.
16 This array of options was listed by Professor Gary Laser in response to a question I

asked at the AALS meeting. AALS tape, supra note 6, Laser comments.
17 Id.
18 J&

CLINICAL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 1:685

tion rebate for working on fee-generating work, nor are they paid any
wages or bonuses.' 9
III.

QUESTIONS ABoUT FEE-FOR-SERVICE CLINICAL PROGRAMS

A.

Balancing Teaching and Billable Client Service

Posit a hypothetical clinical teacher whose contract requires her
to bring in fees equal to 150 percent of her salary, to cover overhead.
Assume her salary is $100,000, so her obligation is $150,000. Her
work is billed to clients based on hours worked, and her billing rate is
$150 per hour. To fulfill her contract, the school must get paid for at
least 1000 hours of her work per year.
This sounds like a very modest number. Many firms set targets or
minimums of 1500 to 2000 hours for associates. But examine what
would be required for h&r to bring in the requisite amount of income.
First, assume that some percentage of her time billed will not be
paid,20 so she must bill perhaps twenty percent more hours to be confident that at least 1000 will be paid. This brings her "target" to
1200.21

Second, how many hours per week must she work to reach the
1200 target? One expert on hourly billing suggests that if one is billing
only for properly billable professional activity, one must work three
hours for every two billed.2 This covers time spent having lunch,
chatting with co-workers, doing non-billable work such as reading to
keep up in one's field, cleaning off one's desk, and the countless other
activities that are necessary to the practice of law but are not professional services to a particular client. Some of this would overlap with
time a clinician spent in a normal workday, but this figure does not
assume that the lawyer has any teaching obligations. Those would be
additional work hours. If the teacher needed to work three hours for
every two billed, she would need to work 1800 hours to bill 1200.
Third, how many weeks of client service time are available to a
clinical teacher whose terms of employment are roughly equivalent to
those of tenure-track faculty?23 The activities of a law school clinical
19 AALS Tape, supra note 6, Matasar comments.
20 I have no data on this, but I imagine some clients would have financial problems,
while others would object to the amounts billed.
21 This hypothetical assumes that a sufficient number of clients able to pay $150 per
hour are available, and that the clinician is able to bill all her client service time at that

rate.

22 William Ross, The Ethics of Hourly Billing by Attorneys, 44 RUTGERS L. REv. 1, 14
(1991), citing McMenamin, Lawyers at Bay, 31 LAW OFF. ECON. & MGM'r. 370,373 (1991).
23 At Chicago-Kent, clinicians employed on a long-term contract basis instead of a ten-

ure or tenure-track arrangement. Dean Matasar described these as "'405e-equivalent status
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faculty member might (conservatively estimated) include the following non-client service activities:
-at least two weeks per year at -conferences;24
-at least four weeks of vacation time, including summer, Christmas
break, and spring break;
-at least one week devoted to pro bono work;25
-at least two weeks a year for participation in law school governance activities-faculty meetings, committee meetings, commit26
tee work;
-at least one week per year for bar association or other professional activities;
-at least one week per year for illness or other unscheduled absence from work.
This list includes eleven weeks of non-client-related activity. I
have not yet listed any teaching time. If one assumed a happy marriage of client service and student teaching, and no writing at all, this
would give the teacher 41 weeks a year to do client service. If during
these weeks the lawyer worked 44 hours a week 27 aside from teaching
time, the lawyer could expect to get paid for 1000 hours of client service time.
The next question is how much time would be needed for work
with students that would be additional to hours spent on client service.
Estimating the time required for teaching is difficult, because law
professors vary so much in schedules and habits. Nevertheless, assume the following hypothetical schedule. The clinician has ten students who work in teams of two, and teaches one two-hour seminar
per week. The teacher meets with each team in tutorial format for an
hour and a half per week, and spends three hours per week preparing
for class. Tutorial meetings are spent discussing cases, but a primary
objective of those meetings is to stimulate student reflection on matters arising in cases.
Time spent teaching students how to think about cases is mainly a
service to the students and not to the clients. Likewise all in-class and
contracts." AALS tape, supra note 6, Matasar comments. (The text of 405(e) appears
infra at note 56.)
24 Hundreds of clinical teachers each year attend a four-day AALS Annual Meeting, an
AALS Professional Development Workshop on Clinical Education, and a conference of
the Clinical Legal Education Association. Most attend other conferences in addition.
25 The comments to Rule 6.1 of the ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct suggest
40 hours a year as an appropriate minimum for pro bono service.
26 Dean Matasar explained that the clinicians at Chicago-Kent have nearly (but for
hiring decisions) full participation in the governance of the law school. AALS Tape, supra
note 6, Matasar comments.
27 This is based on dividing 1800 hours per year (estimated work time needed to get
paid for 1000 hours) by 41 weeks of client service time.
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class preparation time is not client service time. Such hours presumably would not be billable to clients. This conservative estimate 28 adds
another twelve and a half hours to each work week. In other words,
during weeks in which there are no crises, disruptions, or unexpected
developments in cases that require additional supervision time,29 the
clinician should expect a work week of 56 1h hours. This would translate into a schedule of 8 am to 7:30 pm five days a week.
A few observations emerge from this excursion into the schedule.
First, the requirement to bill time adds enormous pressure to a clinician's schedule and requires that clinicians work many more hours
than tenure-track faculty. Second, it is very confusing to distinguish
which hours are billable client service time and which are non-billable
teaching time. The structure of the situation would encourage this clinician to avoid drawing clear lines between teaching and client service
so that she could treat more of the time as billable. Third, it would be
virtually impossible for this clinician to produce scholarship, unless
she took no vacations, attended no professional meetings, or dropped
out of governance. Her fee-generation obligations would greatly limit
her professional development as an academic. Since many clinical
teaching positions are tenure-track and require scholarship, this structure would reduce the likelihood that she could move on to another
school. This situation is potentially more stressful than working in a
private law firm, because only the clinicians would be facing billing
pressure, so the expectations relating to governance are based on priorities other than income generation.
This hypothetical and the numbers I have used may diverge from
the reality of work in the Chicago-Kent clinic in a number of different
ways. But no matter what numbers one posits, one finds either pressure to reach the contract target or enormous financial incentives to
exceed it. In either case, the teacher is pressed to keep her non-billable teaching time to a minimum to maximize her billing time.
B. The "Reflective Practitioner"in a Fee-for-Service Clinic
Professor Laser's theoretical model for the pedagogy of the
clinical program is greatly influenced by the ideas of Donald Sch6n,
who describes the process of teaching "the art of lawyering" through a
"reflective practicum" in which students "learn by undertaking
28 I am assuming here that the time spent by the teacher reviewing draft documents,
doing research, reading files, attending meetings with clients, etc., is included in the hours
estimated for client service, even though it takes more hours to supervise students engaged
in these activities than to do the work oneself.
29 This hypothetical undisrupted work week is proffered as humor. The work week of
many live-client clinical teachers is swallowed by crises, disruptions and unexpected developments in cases that require endless amounts of additional supervision time.
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projects... under close supervision. . . relatively free of the pressures,
distractions and risks of the real [world], to which, nevertheless, it refers . .. 3 and in which, according to Professor Laser, "the clinical
professor (as coach) should regularly engage in reflective activity with
the student while the student is working on the lawyering activity
31
assigned."
Professor Laser posits that work in a fee-for-service clinic is more
like law practice and therefore more realistic than teaching done in
clinics that provide pro bono legal service to indigent clients. He
states:
The MacCrate Report identifies a weakness in traditional in-house
clinical education programs when it notes that they do not "duplicate the pressures and intensity of a practice setting." ...
Our in-house clinical program far more closely approximates a
real practice setting, because it is the concern with fees that creates
much of the pressure and intensity that the MacCrate Report finds
lacking. 32
There may be an inverse relationship between the economic efficiency of legal work and its pedagogical value. Some of the best learning is accomplished through a lengthy reflective dialogue in which the
student is able to raise and explore a wide range of questions about
how to address a legal problem. Careful thought, observation, and
reflection produce meaningful learning. A profit-driven organization
is not an environment conducive to this type of academic activity. Financial or other pressure on lawyers and teachers can make it more
difficult for a professional to give full attention to the ethical, strategic
and pedagogical questions that arise in the practice of law.
I offer two stories, one from a live-client clinic and one from an
externship program, to illustrate the quality of reflection that is possible in academic clinical teaching. My hypothesis is that fee-for-service
clinical teaching offers significant disincentives to this type of
teaching.
30 DoNALD SCHON, EDUCAING THE REFI.ECrivE

PRACrONER

(1987) quoted in La-

ser, supra note 10, at 256.
31 Id

32 Laser, supra note 5, at 439, quoting the MacCrate Report, supra note 1, at 234. Professor Laser does not identify what sort of clinical programs he is comparing to the one at
Chicago-Kent; I infer that he is referring to non-fee clinics because of the reference to

fees.
The passage in the MacCrate report to which Professor Laser refers states:
While even well-structured law school clinical programs would rarely be able to duplicate the pressures and intensity of a practice setting, law schools provide a unique
opportunity for exposing students to the full range of these practice skills, an opportunity that might not be readily available in actual practice. Id.
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A Call to Opposing Counsel

I taught for two years at the Center for Applied Legal Studies, a
clinical program at Georgetown University Law Center. 33 In an article about our teaching methodology, I and my colleagues there reported that
a phone call to opposing counsel asking for a week's delay in a hearing date might be discussed at several case team meetings.... [T]he
case team might discuss whether the request should be made by telephone, letter, mailgram or personal contact; who should make the
call and to whom she should speak; and how the request might be
phrased. Team members might anticipate the range of possible responses, and might consider whether anything had to be given up as
the price of making the request; this inquiry might lead to a reevaluation of the decision to ask for the postponement. The interns
might rehearse the contact with the lawyer by role-playing it. After
the actual contact was made, another case team meeting might be
used to review the outcome. This retrospective review might include significant emphasis on process, such as an examination of
whether the interns followed up any leads of the opposing counsel
(such as hints about settlement) and if so, whether they did so by
design or out of deference to the opposing counsel's greater experience. The case team might look at which intern did the most talking
during the contact, and why, and at the emotions of the call and how
they affected the outcome. The advisors would raise questions that
the interns did not themselves identify, until the subject had been
covered thoroughly. The meeting might conclude with an internrun evaluation of what they had learned from this scrutiny of a minor incident. 4
This hypothetical describes the intense scrutiny that we often applied
to conduct regarded by practitioners as entirely routine. In private
practice such a minor event would be unlikely to be discussed in any
depth. Law students are often reluctant to ask too many questions of
employers or teachers because the questions might reveal ignorance
of some basic information about the legal profession. Yet, these supervisory discussions are particularly valuable as an introduction to
law practice. They provide students with an opportunity to explore in
33 I was a Clinical Fellow at the Center for Applied Legal Studies from 1982 to 1984. I
taught a clinical course using similar methodology at the University of West Virginia College of Law from 1984 to 1985. I refer to these temporally distant events because my more
recent teaching responsibilities have not included live-client clinical courses. More recent
work that informs my perspective on fee-for-service clinical teaching includes supervision
of students doing legal externships for academic credit (1987 to the present) and my research on lawyer billing practices. See articles cited infra at note 55.
34 Jane H. Aiken, David A. Koplow, Lisa G. Lerman, J.P. Ogilvy & Philip G. Schrag,
The Learning Contractin Legal Education, 44 MD. L. REv. 1047, 1054 n.33 (1985).
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detail their questions and observations about their first representational experiences.
2. An Overheard Conversation
The second story involves a student who was working in a prosecutor's office for academic credit, and was participating in an externship seminar that I was teaching. One day the student came to my
office to discuss an incident that had occurred at the prosecutor's office. She had just finished watching a trial conducted by her supervisor, and she left the courtroom. In the hallway she overheard a police
officer who had testified in the trial telling another officer that he had
completely fabricated his testimony. He was bragging to his friend,
joking about it, celebrating the conviction of the defendant.
The student went to see her supervisor and reported what she
had heard in the hallway. The reaction of the supervisor was sort of
neutral-something like "These things happen all the time." The student remonstrated with the supervisor, and asked whether this perjured testimony should be reported to the judge. The supervisor
declined to take any action, and indicated to the student that she was
being naive.
The student was agitated when she came to tell me about this.
Was she crazy or was there something wrong here? We went over the
relevant ethical rules together, and concluded that the prosecutor may
have had an obligation to report the matter to the judge.35 After
some deliberation, the student decided not to pursue the matter any
further in the prosecutor's office, but to make a presentation about it
in class. The class spent a rather intense hour evaluating the conduct
of the supervisor and the student, discussing the difficulties presented
when a subordinate notices unethical conduct by a supervisor, and the
prosecutor's attitude toward the perjured testimony. The class ran
twenty minutes past the end time. The student decided she was no
longer interested in pursuing a career in criminal law.
Some would argue that as a member of the bar I had an obligation to report the prosecutor to the disciplinary authorities for viola35 If a lawyer becomes aware that perjured testimony has been presented, the lawyer
must in many jurisdictions take steps to ensure that the tribunal is informed that the testimony was perjured. See AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION STANDING COMMIrEE ON ETmics
AND PROFESSIONAL REsPONSiBLrry, FORMAL OPINION 87-353 (April 20, 1987) (interpreting Rule 3.3(a)(2) of the Model Rules of Professional Conduct to require a lawyer who
"knows the client has committed perjury [to make] disclosure to the tribunal ... to avoid
assisting the client's criminal act"). While this analysis refers to testimony by a client, similar analysis might lead to disclosure of perjured testimony by a witness whose testimony
was presented by a prosecutor.
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tion of a disciplinary rule.36 At the time I did not consider taking this
action because I regarded my tutorial relationship to the student as
analogous to a lawyer-client relationship, 37 in that the possibility of
open communication between externs and their faculty supervisors
depends on the externs having confidence that events relating to fieldwork disclosed in tutorial discussions will not be revealed to the supervisors.38 In hindsight I believe I should have explored this question in
more detail with the student. Such a discussion might lead the student
to consider the possibility of talking further with the supervisor or
with another lawyer at the placement organization. A student might
decide to make a report to the bar disciplinary authorities or to authorize me to do so.39 Regardless of whether the discussion led to
further action, the full exploration of options and obligations in responding to misconduct by a supervisor offers rich learning
opportunities.
In a fee-for-service clinic this type of reflection would be unlikely
to occur. The patterns of practice would be set by the supervisory
habits of the practitioners teaching in the clinic, and would be unlikely
to follow this "academic/reflective" model. Reflective dialogue in a
live-client clinic is extremely time-consuming. In a fee-for-service
clinic, it is likely that the primary objective would be to get work done
for clients, and not to stimulate the students to engage in serious
thinking about their work.
C. The Impact of Billing Time on PedagogicalDecisions
Some clients of the Chicago-Kent clinic are billed on the basis of
how many hours are spent by the clinical teachers in providing service
36 I am a member of the DC Bar. Rule 8.3 of the DC Rules of Professional Conduct
provides:
A lawyer having knowledge that another lawyer has committed a violation of the

rules of professional conduct that raises a substantial question as to that lawyer's
honesty, trustworthiness, or fitness as a lawyer in other respects, shall inform the
appropriate professional authority.
37 It is this commitment that leads me not to specify which ethical rules the student and

I consulted. That revelation might enable a reader to identify which prosecutor's office
was involved. This could violate my commitment to my student.
38 Rule 8.3 of the D.C. Rules of Professional Conduct, which requires reporting of lawyer misconduct, "does not require disclosure of information otherwise protected by Rule
1.6." The student-teacher relationship is not an attorney-client relationship, but in this
course becomes another sort of confidential relationship.

Of course in this situation, even absent the confidential relationship, my obligation to
report is far from clear, since my "knowledge" is third-hand, and the rule imposes an obligation only if I make a subjective judgment that the violation "raises a substantial question
as to that lawyer's honesty, trustworthiness, or fitness as a lawyer in other respects."
39 In this instance I did talk with the student about the possibility of the student's pursuing the question at her placement, but I deferred to her judgment that she had done all
that she could do as an extern.
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to the clients. Among American lawyers, hourly billing is the dominant method of determining fees to be charged to clients. 40 This discussion explores the potential impact of hourly billing on live-client
clinical teaching.
1.

To Limit Supervision Time

I mentioned earlier the question of what if any part of the student
supervision would be billable to a client in a fee-for-service clinic. A
clinician who regarded income generation and teaching as two separate activities would take the position that supervision time should not
be billed. This clinician would be constrained then to limit supervision
time in order reach the billing target.
A more flexible approach might be that time spent by a teacher
with students discussing action to be taken on a case should be billable, especially since the student time on the matter is then donated to
the client. However, tutorial time spent in discussion of matters not
directly beneficial to the client would not be billable. This would preclude billing for educational time-e.g., time spent reflecting on or
critiquing a hearing or a settlement negotiation or a telephone call, to
the extent that the purpose of the discussion was to benefit the student and not the client. A clinician who followed this analysis might
then keep a calendar handy during tutorial meetings to record how
much time was spent on which matters. The teacher might be constrained however, to limit the time spent in supervision meetings discussing questions that were not directly relevant to service to be
performed by the client, because it would be practically impossible to
keep a running record of which time was spent on student-focussed
issues and which time was spent on client-focussed issues.
A teacher who experienced no such constraints and billed clients
for time spent in non-task-specific reflection with students would be in
an ethically awkward posture unless clients were informed and had
consented to pay hourly fees at professional rates for time spent by
their lawyers training law students. More appropriate is to limit the
supervision time or to keep the supervision time very task-focussed.

40 See Herbert Kritzer, Austin Sarat, David M. Trubek, Kristin Bumiller & Elizabeth
McNichol, Understanding the Costs of Litigation: The Case of the Hourly-Fee Lawyer,"

1984 AM. B. FouND. REs. J. 559, 565 n.16 (over half of 1,382 lawyers surveyed bill by the
hour: "56 were paid on a flat fee basis, 757 on an hourly basis, 431 on a contingent fee
basis, and 138 on some other basis (i.e., they were employees of corporations, legal aid,
prepaid legal service plans, or their fee was to be paid on some combination of hourly, flat,

and/or contingent)").
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2.

To Maintain a High Caseload
Many clinics engage their students in extensive planning and reflection in part by maintaining low caseloads. When I was teaching at
the Center for Applied Legal Studies, for example, we dropped the
caseload from three cases per team of two students to two cases per
team of two students because we found that a three-case load imposed
time pressure that made it difficult for the students to do thorough
representational work and interfered with our ability to explore the
cases with the students in adequate depth.
If a clinician has an annual billing target, the number of cases
accepted would be likely to be dictated primarily by the relative billing potential bf each case and the number needed to meet the target.
The financial demands of the employment contract would constrain
the teacher's judgment about how many cases could be handled by a
student 4' consistent with the goal of leaving sufficient time for extensive planning, reflection, and extra care to compensate for the inexperience of the student practitioners.
3.

To Select Cases Based on Potential Fees
In the Georgetown clinic where I taught we hand-picked small
cases from the Small Claims Court file, and called pro se parties to
volunteer pro bono assistance. We picked small cases because we believed that students learn best in a posture in which they have primary
responsibility for representation of a client, and in which they handle
every aspect of a case from intake through enforcement of a judgment. This was best accomplished through small cases. Often it was
possible for the students to complete these cases in the course of one
semester; this meant the next semester's students could begin at the
beginning with new clients.
Some of the best teaching cases had little dollar value. We accepted one case on behalf of a client who had hired some workers to
trim a large tree that stood in front of the client's house. The workers
had seriously damaged the tree. The client had sued for a refund of
the $75 paid for the pruning. 42 In the course of representing this client
the students learned an enormous amount about interviewing, legal
research, fact investigation, court procedure, and negotiation. The cli41 As discussed below, this structure also might lead the teacher not to "assign" cases to
each student, but to retain primary responsibility for the cases, only delegating specific
tasks to students.
42 The teachers debated whether we should accept this case. I believed that it was of
particular interest because of the disproportion between the amount of the monetary claim
and the degree of injury perceived by the plaintiff. During the investigation of the case the
students learned that the value of the tree far exceeded the cost of the defective service, so
the damages claimed in the initial pro se petition were understated.
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ent cared deeply about the tree, but the stakes were low enough to
allow the students to work without fearing dire consequences from
some unknown error.
When I was in private practice my firm accepted a case involving
a client who had been bitten by a poisonous snake. The case would
have been an excellent teaching case; it involved complex fact investigation, jurisdictional and other legal questions. After a short time the
firm transferred the case to another firm because the risk of non-recovery was simply too great to justify any further investment of resources. Perhaps if the firm had been housed within a law school we
would have kept the case 43-but if the clinic had been a fee-generating office the case might have been transferred out for the same reasons as my firm decided to assist the client in finding other counsel.
The point is that financial pressure may limit the teacher's ability
to select cases based on their pedagogical potential."
4. To Subordinate Public Service Goals to Earning Fees
Some clinical teachers believe that the most significant teaching
objective in a clinical program is to expose the students to issues of
poverty and issues of injustice to economically disadvantaged people.4 5 Teachers at Chicago-Kent are encouraged to do pro bono work,
and some are paid from grants and do not charge fees, but the fee-forservice clinicians must fit their pro bono work in with their fee generation obligations, just like lawyers in private practice. The clinical program does not make the provision of legal service to indigent clients a
central objective.
The law school administration expresses encouragement for pro
bono work, but the terms of the clinicians' employment contracts do
43 The facts of this case formed the basis of a set of simulation materials published for
use in Civil Procedure classes. PHELEn G. ScHRAG, Cvi. PROCEDURE: A SIMUA.TION
SUPPLEMENT (1990).
44 This point was made at the AALS meeting by Professor David Chavkin of The Co-

lumbus School of Law, The Catholic University of America. AALS Tape, supra note 6,

Chavkin comments.
45 See., e.g. Gary Bellow, Clinical Studies in Law, in LooKING AT LAW SCHOOL: A
292, 297, 299-300
(Stephen Gillers ed., 3d rev. ed., 1990) (clinical education helps students "to see the law in
operation 'from below' as well as 'from above,"' to see "the impact of race, gender and
class on the functioning of law and lawyers," and thereby to develop "a normative concern
for the fairness, accessibility, and justness of the legal system and its influence on the social
order of which it is a part"); Arthur B. LaFrance, ClinicalEducation and the Year 2010, 37
J. LEGAL EDuC. 352, 354 (1987) (clinics that serve indigent clients "provide[ ] an ethical
and social education for students that simply cannot be replicated in any other settings").
Professor Randolph Stone of the University of Chicago Law School identified teaching
STUDENT GUIDE FROM THE SOCIETY OF AMERICAN LAw TEACHERS

about poverty and injustice to economically disadvantaged people as among his primary
objectives as a clinical teacher. AALS tape, supra note 6, Stone comments.

CLINICAL LAW REVIEW

[V/ol. 1:685

not. The agreements speak not in terms of a certain number of hours
worked, but in terms of a certain number of dollars paid to the law
school by the teacher's clients. The bottom line is money.
This policy contrasts with some private law firms which set an
annual target for hours billed, but count pro bono hours toward satisfaction of the target. By placing pro bono work on an equal footing
with fee-generating work, these firms offer meaningful encouragement to lawyers to do pro bono work. 46
Perhaps the law school administration would respond that the
terms of the employment contract set modest requirements for income generation compared to many private law firms, and that this
leaves much opportunity for pro bono work. I would simply point out
that the law school expects from its clinicians a large amount of other
non-billable work, in the face of which pro bono service to clients
might be marginalized.
5. To Make Decisions About Conduct of Cases Based on Fee Issues
Once cases are accepted, the fee-for-service structure must impose some pressure on the clinical teachers, as it does on lawyers in
private practice, to make decisions that will be most financially rewarding (or least damaging) to the lawyer. A hypothetical example:
A lawyer is handling four matters: one pro bono case about to go to
trial, a divorce in which the client is a middle-income woman with
limited resources, a criminal case in which a substantial non-refundable retainer has already been paid, and a contract negotiation on
behalf of a corporation that is paying $200 for every hour billed by
the lawyer. Assume that all these matters suddenly require immediate action. How is the lawyer to divide his time?
Dean Matasar observed that the clinicians at Chicago-Kent are
very good at resisting the pressure to allow economics to drive their
decisions about how to practice law. He says that each lawyer
must balance how much a case is worth, how much effort can be put
into that case on behalf of a client, how much time has to be written
off in order to do an effective job on behalf of that client, ethically
representing that client, and taking the lump that will come with the
fact that it is not going to be remunerative to do the work. Balancing pro bono is part of the obligation. Our students are brought
into the loop at every stage. 47
If the hypothetical clinician in my example were not charging fees
for service, he would be freer to divide his time based on the real
46 See Timothy Lindon & Susan Hoffman, Pro Bono: Can it Survive the Bottom Line?,
WAsHmNGTON LAWYER 26 (Sept.-Oct. 1990).
47 AALS Tape, supra note 6, Matasar comments.
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needs of his clients and his students. Introducing the fee arrangement
creates a significant conflict between his own financial interests, his
obligations as a teacher, and his obligations as an attorney. Of course
this type of conflict is regarded as quite normal in private practice, but
in a teaching institution, it may result in less attention to the educational mission.
6.

To Relegate the Students to the Role of Law Clerks

Another likely consequence of structuring a clinic as a fee-forservice operation is to reduce the amount of responsibility that the
teacher is willing to turn over to the students.4 The teacher is the
"partner" who has brought in the clients; to satisfy them and to ensure payment of fees, the lawyer may retain the most visible role on
most matters. If he does not bill for student time he must invest
enough of his own time and do enough of the work himself that there
will be a substantial fee. If he charges a higher fee for time spent in
court, how likely is he to allow a student to conduct a hearing while he
sits in the back of the room?
Likewise, many clients of law school clinics are concerned that
the margin of error is higher if the students take substantial responsibility for providing the services than if the services are provided by
their teacher. In a non-fee-generating clinic, the level of student responsibility is disclosed at the outset, and both teachers and students
work to ensure that the service provided is of high quality.49 A feepaying client, however, would expect the personal service of a lawyer
for whose time the client is being billed. Therefore the level of student responsibility would be more comparable to that of a law clerk
than to that of a student in a live-client litigation clinic.
Another consequence of the "law clerk/associate role" in which
students find themselves at Chicago-Kent might be a lesser degree of
engagement in clinical work than one might find at a non-fee clinic.
The degree of engagement tends to track the level of responsibility
assigned to students in performance of legal work.
48 Professor Laser acknowledged that students assume less responsibility for cases at
the Chicago-Kent clinic than at some other clinics, but he urged that this structure was
pedagogically desirable because of the value of modeling as a teaching technique. He reported that the students at Chicago-Kent worked in a relationship with their teachers "similar to the partner-associate model ... and the law students learn not only by performing
but by observing a role model." AALS Tape, supra note 6, Laser comments.
49 In the clinics where I taught, the quality of service usually far exceeded that provided
to clients who paid lawyers for similar services; the principal reason was that the clinic
students spent far more time researching and developing the cases than any client could
have afforded to pay. A low caseload and intensive supervision often can more than compensate for the risks to a client hiring inexperienced counsel.
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How then would a student's work in a fee-for-service clinic differ
from a student's work in a law clerk position in which the student
might earn $12-15 per hour? Presumably the difference is in the
teacher's engagement of the student in reflective dialogue. As I explained above, 50 however, the structure of the institution is less conducive to such dialogue than a non-fee clinic or an externship seminar.
D. The Ethics of Billing Clients: Can It Be Taught in a
Fee-for-Service Clinic?
Difficult ethical issues are raised by the conflict of interest between lawyer and client that arises whenever the lawyer and client
agree that the lawyer will provide services and the client will pay a fee.
In organizations in which the lawyers' earnings are not affected by the
number of clients served or the amount of service provided,5 ' lawyers
are in a better position to fulfill the fiduciary obligation to decide what
services to provide based on the client's needs. Even in the absence of
payment of fees, the lawyer's self-interest can affect decisions made
on behalf of clients. Some work may result in positive or negative
attention to the lawyer. Some work may be so time-consuming as to
interfere with other work or personal time. However, the pervasive
conflict of interest presented by the lawyer's financial interest in her
client's money is sharper and more problematic than many of these
other "self-interest" conflicts.
Professor Laser urges that the Chicago-Kent program is a better
teaching environment because of its fuller replication of a private law
firm environment than a typical poverty law clinical program.52 If one
could be immersed in private practice and then step back to a remote
location from which to critically reflect on the practice environment,
this exposure to "the realities of practice" would produce significant
learning. 53 How effectively can a teacher separate himself from his
50 See text accompanying notes 30-39.
51 These organizations include government agencies, legal services organizations, nonprofit organizations and traditional clinical programs.
52 Laser, supra note 5, at 439. Laser urges that the Chicago-Kent program is more
realistic because it includes pressures related to fees that are absent from most clinics. But
then he says that students need protection from some of the pressures of practice. Id.
53

See discussion of reflective dialogue in externship classes at text accompanying notes

35-39. In my Professional Responsibility classes I distribute a questionnaire called "Work-

ing with Lawyers" in which I ask each student to identify an experience he has had working
with lawyers which affected his view of the profession or his ideas about becoming a law-

yer, and then to describe it in detail and explain its impact. In response to this questionnaire I receive many stories about billing fraud and the students' reactions to billing
practices they have seen in law firms where they have been employed. I know of no law
students and only a small number of lawyers who have attempted to communicate with
others in the firm about questionable billing practices.
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own self-interest and teach students about the ethical issues presented
by billing questions while billing clients?
A fee-for-service clinician might endeavor to model appropriate
billing practices, to keep squeaky-clean records of time spent, and to
make thoughtful and conservative decisions about what to bill for.
The teacher might invite the students to review time sheets, to observe
and participate in staff discussions of billing practices, and might assign readings to assist the students to understand ethical questions
about billing practices.
The teacher might engage the students in discussions of what
should be the impact of a lawyer's fiduciary obligations to clients on
decisions about padding bills, billing for recycled work, or double-billing.54 The class might discuss whether it is ethical to bill a client for
time spent eating, sleeping, watching a movie, mowing the lawn, or
taking a shower. If the lawyer is thinking about the case, travelling for
a client, or working late, does this justify billing for time spent engaged in these non-work activities? The class might discuss whether
and under what circumstances a lawyer billing for such activities is
obliged to disclose those facts to a client. They might discuss what
type of disclosure would discharge the fiduciary obligation to a
corporation.55
A fee-for-service clinic could provide this type of important educational opportunity, but such discussions might lead to felt constraints that would reduce the income of the clinical teachers. The
discussions would be more likely to occur if fees earned by the clinic
had no impact on the teachers' earnings.
Even in a fee-for-service clinic in which the ethics of billing practices was part of the curriculum, would a student be in a good position
to raise a question about a teacher's billing practices? A hypothetical
example:
Assume that after careful consideration the clinic has decided to bill

its clients at 22 cents a page for photocopying, thereby charging less
than the cheapest firms in town for photocopying. Assume a student knows that copies can be had at Kinko's for 5 cents a page, and
has read ABA Opinion 93-379, and believes the 22 cents to be arguably unethical because the law school is then earning a profit on
administrative services. Some students would raise this type of
54 See AMERICAN BAR ASSOCJATION STANDING CommI=irEE oN

Enmcs

AND PROFES-

REsPONSIBn-rrY, Formal Opinion 93-379 (Dec. 6, 1993) for a discussion of these
and other questions about hourly billing practices.
55 For discussion of these issues see Lisa 0. Lerman, Lying to Clients, 138 U. PA. L.
SIONAL

REv. 659, 705-719 (1990); Conference on Gross Profits, 22 HoFsTrA L. REv. 625 (1994)
(essays by Lisa G. Lerman, Duncan A. MacDonald, John J. Marquess, Carl M. Selinger &
Roy Simon).
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question with their teachers. Most would just talk to their friends
about it. Some would worry that if the student brought it up it
could affect the grade the teacher would give him or her in the
clinical course.
E.

Impact of Salary Structure on Faculty Relations and Position of
Clinic Within the Law School

ABA Accreditation Standard 405(e) represents a broad consensus in American legal education that the terms of employment of
clinical teachers should be "reasonably similar to those provided to
other full-time faculty members. '56 During the last fifteen years, law
schools have worked to eliminate the status hierarchy between clinical
and non-clinical teachers by placing clinical positions on the tenure
track or providing long-term contracts with equivalent salary and
benefits.
Fee generation obligations such as those imposed by contract on
many clinical teachers at Chicago-Kent 57 would tend to re-institute
and extend the status hierarchy that once was common between
clinical and non-clinical teachers. This structure represents a dramatic divergence from recent changes at other law schools to integrate
clinical courses, teachers and teaching methods into the law school
curriculum.
Faculty at most law schools have the freedom to select academic
interests regardless of income potential. Likewise, law faculty generally are free to work without institutional pressure to generate income
for the law school and without fear of personal financial consequences
if they fail to generate income. Most law faculty, including many clinicians, have nine-month employment contracts. This allows them to
spend the summer months writing, developing teaching materials, engaging in other professional activity, and taking vacations.
Many non-fee clinical programs select cases that are likely to be
completed at the end of each semester. Some clinical programs hire
lawyers other than the full-time teachers to handle clinical casework
during the summers. These structures allow many clinical teachers to
56 AMEIucAN BAR ASSOCIATION, STANDARDS FOR APPROVAL OF LAW SCHOOLS AND

Standard 405(e) provides:
The law school should afford to full-time faculty members whose primary responsibilities are in its professional skills program a form of security of position reasonably
similar to tenure and perquisites reasonably similar to those provided to other fulltime faculty members by [other] Standards.... The law school should require these
faculty members to meet standards and obligations reasonably similar to those re-

INTERPRETATIONS,

quired of full-time faculty members by [other] Standards ....
I am not aware of any other clinical program that contracts with clinical teachers to
generate income to cover their own salaries.
57

Spring 19951

Fee-for-Service Clinical Teaching

enjoy the same professional and personal freedoms as their nonclinical counterparts during the summer.
The structure of a fee-for-service clinic might greatly reduce the
freedom of the clinical teachers to select cases that will end by summer; each lawyer who has a fee generation contract must seek to represent clients able to pay fees that will help the lawyer to satisfy his or
her obligation to the law school. Also if the teachers spend substantial
time engaged in non-billable teaching from August through April, the
summer months may provide an opportunity to bill more hours doing
client service than is possible during the academic year.
As if these inequities were insufficient, there is a second tier of
status hierarchy within the Chicago-Kent clinical program. One division is between Professor Laser, the director, who is tenured, and presumably is exempt from fee generation, the long-term contract
clinicians, who must produce fees, and the grant clinicians, who have
salaries but shorter-term contracts. Another layer of stratification exists among the fee-generating clinical faculty, between those hired earlier and those hired more recently, the latter required to produce 150
percent as much in fees as the former.
Some readers might ask: "So what? Hierarchy exists in all institutions, and is necessary for any organization to function. '58 I would
respond that one of the best features of law faculties is the relative
absence of hierarchy, and the formally equal teaching and governance
responsibilities of the most and least senior faculty.59 Non-clinical
faculty are generally expected to carry equal teaching loads regardless
of seniority. Especially contrasted with the steep hierarchy within private law firms, the law school faculty culture is egalitarian.
One potential harm from requiring clinical teachers to earn their
salaries by generating fees might be to marginalize the clinical program, to treat clinical teaching as secondary to the mission of the law
school. 60 Also the clinicians individually might be less valued, less
61
respected, and more burdened by the law school than other faculty.
58 For a contrary view, see Duncan Kennedy, Legal Education and the Reproduction of
Hierarchy, 32 J. LEGAL. EDUC. 591 (1982).
59 An exception, of course, is the promotion and tenure process, in which senior faculty
often have more decisional authority.
60 Professor Martin Guggenheim of New York University School of Law pointed this
out at the AALS meeting in New Orleans, saying "Ican't imagine you saying to a faculty
member: 'We would welcome you here if you promise to pay your own freight fully.' The
fact that that is an unimaginable conversation to have with non-clinicians suggests how
deeply offensive this is to clinicians." AALS Tape, supra note 6, Guggenheim comments.
61 Professor Guggenheim characterized the salary arrangements as a statement that
"We have decided there is a central mission here and you [the clinicians] are not part of it."
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Even with these burdens, fee-for-service clinical teaching positions may be attractive to many lawyers compared to private practice.62 But the fact that the market tolerates this inequality among the
teachers does not mean that this structure is beneficial to the pursuit
of the educational mission of the school.
Teaching, scholarship and professional development are all inextricably intertwined. Law teachers who are precluded from some
forms of scholarship and other professional development are unlikely
to teach as well as they might if they were more valued by their institutions; ultimately they tend to be ghettoized and isolated from the
academic community within the law school.
F. Use of the Privileges of a Non-Profit EducationalInstitution by
a Profit-Making Clinic
Another set of questions about the fee-for-service clinic idea concerns the use of the facilities and resources of a not-for-profit educational institution either for the personal enrichment of teachers or for
63
the enrichment of the organization. If a law school pays no taxes
becau.se its purpose is educational, but one wing of a law school is
organized in its fee structure and compensation system much like a
for-profit law firm, questions arise about the propriety of use of the
not-for-profit resources by the profit-making clinical program. 64
Using Unpaid Student Labor to Raise Money
Dean Matasar described the favorable position of a ChicagoKent clinician trying to attract fee-paying clients to the clinic. He described one person who had been an equity partner in a law firm, who
brought a group of clients with him when he came to the law school.
He told the clients that they would get the same services at a lower
hourly rate, and that they would benefit from the library services and
the free student assistance available at the law school.65 The law
school is essentially giving away free student labor as a method of
attracting fee-paying clients to the clinic.
If the student labor assists what is essentially a fund-raising operation, should the students not be paid for their work, or given a partial
1.

62 Dean Matasar reported that the clinicians at Chicago-Kent enjoy their positions.
AALS Tape, supra note 6, Matasar comments.
63 I will not explore here whether there are legal questions raised about whether this
type of arrangement would be inconsistent with 501(c)(3) status, but will explore instead
the propriety of this arrangement.
64 These same questions arise if a professor within a law school sets up a lucrative
practice or consulting business which she conducts using law school resources and while
being paid a law school salary.
65 AALS Tape, supra note 6, Matasar comments.
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tuition rebate? 66 Perhaps they are being paid in educational benefits,
but the students have paid a large amount of money for those educational benefits-in tuition dollars. This is particularly worrisome because some of the funds generated by the clinic become the private
earnings of the clinicians.
Another concern about financial "use" of student work by the
law school is that the clinical program, though it does not bill clients
directly for student time, tracks and reports student hours in fee-shifting cases in the "hope that because of the student time they won't
reduce our hours too much." 67 So here the student labor-which is
meant to be for the student's educational benefit-is being used to
increase the number of fee dollars awarded to the law school by
judges. At the very least this might result in some blurring of the
teacher's perception of the purpose of the student labor.
2.

The Relationship Between the Clinic and the Private Bar

One potentially harmful consequence of the fee-for-service structure of the Chicago-Kent clinic might be resentment from private
practitioners who have to pay bills to support all the services that the
law school clinicians receive without cost. These services include not
only Lexis, Westlaw, and library research services, but also rent, utilities, salaries for administrative support staff, law clerk wages, and
other administrative costs that may far exceed the fifty percent of salary that the clinicians are required to raise to cover overhead. In essence the clinicians might be viewed as having unfair advantages in
competing for client business.
Concern among private practitioners in the community in which
the law school is located is not a litmus test of what is or is not appropriate behavior for a law school. But this possibility is worthy of attention because of the ways that such resentment could be expressed.
One issue is that many private practitioners in any community are
alumni of and contributors to a law school. Some donate services to
the law school by judging moot court competitions or offering guest
lectures. Withdrawal of such support could be harmful to a school.
More worrisome possibilities could include allegations of unauthor-

66 This might be impermissible under Interpretation 1 of ABA Accreditation Standard
306(a), which provides that "Student participants in a law school externship program may
not receive compensation for a program for which they receive academic credit." AMERICAN
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AALS Tape, supra note 6, Laser comments.
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ized practice by students in the clinic, or other legal action alleging
unethical or substandard law practice. 68
G. Slipping into Commercialization
Legal education originated in the United States as a commercial
enterprise; the first law schools emerged from law firms that discovered that it was more lucrative to train apprentices than to represent
clients. 69 With tuition at private schools rapidly approaching $20,000
per year, it would be difficult to maintain the assertion that the law
schools are not now in some respects commercial enterprises. So it
should not surprise us, despite the widespread curricular uniformity
among the law schools, to find that one school is using clinical legal
education as a "profit center" for the law school and for its clinical
teachers.
One fundamental question here is whether the educational mission of a school is harmed by its assuming some of the attributes of a
commercial enterprise. 70 If so, then most of the law schools are in
some degree of trouble. Questions could be raised about high tuition,
high faculty salaries, the use of law schools by universities as "cash
cows", 71 and various profit-making ventures within the law schools,
such as continuing legal education programs and publishing ventures. 72 The problem is one of competing missions: education and
income generation, and the potential of the latter to undermine the
former.
The question is whether and in what respects we might constrain
the development of commercialism within our schools. Assume that
legal education is going to be so expensive in the 21st century that law
school administrators must constantly search for new and creative
ways to bring in more dollars to the law school. I offer a few snap68 Many clinicians in non-fee-for-service clinics have encountered opposing counsel
who are unhappy with the operation of the clinics, sometimes because of the extensive
representational resources being devoted to clients who would otherwise be unrepresented. Many deans have had occasional calls expressing concern about the activities of a
clinical program. If a clinic is competing for business Wvith the private bar, the discomfort
might be greater.
69 ROBERT STEVENS, Two CHEERS FOR 1870: THE AMERICAN LAW SCHOOL (1971).

excerpted in
(1994).

GEOFFREY HAZARD & DEBORAH RHODE,

THE LEoAL

PROFESSION

504

70 See MICHAEL F. JACOBSON & LAURIE ANN MAZUR, MARKETING MADNESS: A SURVIVAL GUIDE FOR A CONSUMER SocITv, Chapter 2, Schools Go Commercial (forthcoming, Westview Press 1995) (describing the increasing presence of advertising in schools and
the harmful impact of corporate interests on the curricula of public schools).
71 Matasar, supra note 6, at 470.
72 Dean Matasar listed CLE programs and publication of electronic teaching materials
as among other commercial efforts at law schools. AALS Tape, supra note 6, Matasar
Comments.
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shots of where we might find ourselves as we blur the lines between
being a school and being a store.
Some law schools might decide to follow the lead of certain undergraduate institutions, and to sell advertising time during class.
They could follow the television model, and have commercial breaks
every ten minutes. During the commercial breaks a professor might
play a short video advertisement-say for a commercial outline covering the subject she is teaching. She might (perhaps for a higher fee)
sing jingles written by companies selling computer equipment, beer, or
cheap airline tickets. She might (for a price of course) distribute literature describing a bar review course, or pass out free samples of soap
or breakfast cereal.73
Some law schools might turn to the expertise of their faculty as a
relatively untapped source of revenue. A law school might offer financial incentives to faculty for generating. a certain amount of consulting income. A percentage of this income would be turned over to
the law school by the faculty member earning it. In fact unpaid scholarship might become obsolete. Constitutional scholars could contract
to produce scholarship taking agreed positions on issues in exchange
for the generous honoraria offered by those who oppose abortion or
gun control. 74 Health law specialists could evaluate legal issues under
the sponsorship of pharmaceutical companies. Some law schools
could establish in-house legal consulting firms, and require that each
faculty member devote fifteen hours per week to work for the consulting firm. 75
Another easy source of cash would be to set a premium tuition
rate-say double the rate for regular admissions-and sell places in
each class to any student willing to pay the higher price. Eventually
73 Professor Philip Schrag of Georgetown University Law Center raised the following
question with Dean Matasar.
Why stop at clinics? Have you considered requiring your faculty members to do a
day a week of practice and devote some fraction of that to the law school? Have you
considered having your faculty sell commercial time in the middle of their lectures,
for Coca-Cola or other products to bring in revenue for the school?... If it is good
for clinics why isn't it good for the rest of the school?
Dean Matasar responded "It is good for the rest of the school. The question is
how do we do it in a way that is consistent with the rest of the educational mission?"
He pointed out that Chicago-Kent takes overhead from faculty grants, sells CLE
programs, and shares income with faculty from electronic teaching materials. AALS
Tape, supra note 6, Schrag and Matasar comments.
74 Ronald K.L. Collins, Letter, Scholarly Ethics (December 7, 1994) (not yet published)
(urging legal scholars whose work is supported by corporate or other sponsors to disclose
such sponsorship).
75 One example of the increasing recognition of law professors as a desirable commodity is the development of consulting firms such as the Legal Resource Network in Los
Angeles, which finds law professors to do piecework for firms needing expertise.
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the current admission criteria could be abandoned, and each place in
each law school class could be sold at an auction to those wishing to
attend.
A final entrepreneurial idea would be for the law schools of the
twenty-first century to establish little shopping malls within the law
school that would serve their students' every material need. Shoes,
clothing, luggage, cosmetics, pharmaceuticals-the law schools would
collect the profits from all these sales, and would employ buyers and
managers and store clerks along with the secretaries and the computer
support staff.
What is disturbing about these examples is how little our institutions would need to change to fit this picture. In at least one important respect private law schools already are commercial enterprises,
selling educational services for as high a price as the market will bear.
Most of our students finish law school with debtloads that will severely constrain their career choices-requiring them to give first priority to the top dollar-and that will financially cripple many of them
for one or two decades after graduation from law school. 76 Many of
them enter law school without doing any financial planning. I sometimes ask second and third year law students what most worries them
about their professional futures. Debt is always at the top of the list. I
then ask how much they will owe, what their monthly payments will
be, and what they need to earn. Most have no idea of the answers to
any but the first of these questions. I agree with Dean Matasar that
We can no longer shift the cost to these kids, as we have been doing
in an unconscionable fashion over the last two decades, and assume
that the private sector will bear this cost through outrageous salaries
that we
that get passed on to clients, who cannot afford the services
77
are providing to them. It is a pyramid that will collapse.
The system depends on the willingness of our students to continue to take on heavy debt responsibilities to pay our high tuitions in
the face of a job market inadequate to provide most of them with
income sufficient to support their loans. If the system continues to

76 The Law School Admissions Services reported a dramatic increase in law student
debt burden between 1989-90 and 1991-92. In 1989-90, 29.1 percent of law graduates had
borrowed between $40,000 and $79,000. In 1991-92, 52.4 percent of law graduates carried
student loans ranging from $40,000 to $79,000. A student at the bottom of this range
would have a ten year obligation of approximately $506 per month. A person in this position who earned $60,720 per year would pay ten percent of gross income toward this loan
obligation. NATIONAL ASSOCIATION FOR PUBLIC INTEREsr LAW, THm NAPIL LoAN REPAYMENT ASSISTANCE PROGRAM REPORT 1994 Introduction (Revised Edition). Consider,
then, the terrible financial position of a student with $80,000 in loans and a $30,000 salary.
77 AALS Tape, supra note 6, Matasar comments.
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function, it is in part because of the financial inexperience of many of
our students.
Where my views may diverge from Dean Matasar's is on the
question of how far into the commercial realm we should allow our
law schools to drift. Of course the law schools need to continue to
develop new ways to generate dollars to reduce tuition dependency
and to reduce the burden of student loans. However, the law schools
should be circumspect about entrepreneurial ideas that would encroach at all on their educational and academic missions.
The Department of Education direct loan program, if it survives
the current Congress, may offer important relief to many students
from unmanageable loan obligations. Under this plan, many students
would be eligible to consolidate their loans and elect to participate in
an income-contingent repayment plan, which would allow a repayment period of twenty-five years, but would set the monthly payments
at a maximum of fifteen percent of income. 78
Law schools should avoid fundraising that would interfere with
teaching or research. Fund-raising from alumni and other sources
does not have a significant impact on the work of the faculty or the
students. Increasing use of on-line research services could reduce the
need for each school to maintain a vast and costly library collection.
The schools could require faculty to pay a portion of their consulting
income to the law school.7 9 Such a policy might have some negative
impact on consulting, but that would free up faculty from moneymaking activities to focus on other teaching and research activities.
IV.

CONCLUSION

This essay articulates some questions about constructing clinical
programs using a fee-for-service model. Some questions are focussed
on the structure of the Chicago-Kent program; others are more abstract. Chicago-Kent may have avoided many, and perhaps even all,
of the potential problems I describe in this essay. However, issues of
pedagogical compromise, faculty status, and alumni relations are
likely to arise in a fee-for-service clinic; they defy easy solution.
78 The regulations implementing this program appear at 59 FED. REG. 61664 et. seq.,
December 1, 1994. See National Association for Public Interest Law, New Federal Law
Opens Public Interest Career Options Through Income-ContingentLoan Repayment (1994)
(brochure available from the National Association for Public Interest Law; on file with
author).
79 At the AALS meeting, Professor Gary Palm of the University of Chicago pointed
out that many law professors earn a great deal of extra income from consulting fees. He
suggested that a portion of this income should be shared with the law school since the
faculty use law school resources to do the work. AALS Tape, supra note 6, Palm
comments.
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Schools that consider establishing a fee-for-service clinic must -consider carefully the potential perils of this structure along with its obvious fiscal advantages.
In an era in which increasing resources are unlikely to be available to pay for expansion of clinical legal education, creativity and
experimentation will be needed to sustain and to expand clinical programs. I suggest that the academic integrity of our law schools may be
better preserved if we decline to allow our classrooms, our clinical
programs or our research activities to become directed or defined by
fundraising activities.

